↳ In-reply-to » @movq @prologic Another option would be: when you edit a twt, prefix the new one with (#[old hash]) and some indication that it's an edited version of the original tweet with that hash. E.g. if the hash used to be abcd123, the new version should start "(#abcd123) (redit)".

@falsifian@www.falsifian.org Yes;

I don’t think twtxt hashes are long enough to prevent spoofing.

The current spec needs to be updated to expand the hash length to 11 characters to avoid hash collisions (which will happen at some point with 7, if not already).

The issue isn’t dealing with “spoofing”, it’s about solving how clients in a decentralised model agree on the threading model and identity of a thread. Message ID(s) suffer from the fact that as @movq@www.uninformativ.de points out, clients have to “obey” this unwritten rule, but they’re otherwise just arbitrary. Whereas Twt Hashes (I didn’t come up with the idea originally, some smart fellow in cryptography did) are content addressable, meaning that clients don’t have to agree on anything, they can trust that the hash is a cryptographic representing of the thread they’re replying to, no matter what.