Exactly 10 years ago Kokori’s first release on vinyl was out - and we celebrated with a release party in one of the afternoons of the Entremuralhas festival.
Ten years later, we’re back attending the festival, and this time we see one of the stands selling our latest release, rootkit, on CD! ♡
I hate reading translations. Here’s an example why: the same passage of the English and the Portuguese translation of the same (French) book. Not just the length of the passage shows one of the translations wasn’t faithful, the behavior of the character in one version is the opposite than how he behaves on the other version…
@abucci@anthony.buc.ci Yeah thanks! 🙏 I think I’ve read this very paper myself, the difference between centralisation, decentralisation and distributed systems are basically summed up in the figure:
@prologic@twtxt.net I am on the “Non-Production Site” plan with NearlyFreeSpeech which means I’m limited to 1 GiB per day of bandwidth and am occasionally subjected to “low-risk tests and betas”. The implication is that there may be downtime on my site but I haven’t noticed any since April of 2020 when I began hosting with them. It’s 1 cent per day as a base cost for that plan.
I also pay $1 per gigabyte-month for storage and I am using 9.29 MiB which means I pay a little less than one cent per month. It used to be even less than that, but since I started using Git the complete Git history is stored on the server as well as the live copy of the site.
There is an additional charge of 1 cent per 44.64 “RAUs”, their measurement combining CPU and memory usage over time. On the Non-Production plan, only resources used by processes other than the Web server are counted. I don’t believe I have ever been charged for this.
Here is my billing report for 2023 so far.
@prologic@twtxt.net here is what I got :
@prologic@twtxt.net kickbike is one of these
Of skies and bullets:
Found another example of Google stealing something I’ve written and putting it in a “featured snippet”.
What’s super annoying about this one is that the source is a course page at Tufts University, not the official page of the publication they’re taking this text from. I know the professor who taught that course and I’ve guest lectured for them before on this topic. They put this publication in their course readings, and I guess that’s where Google picked it up.
podman works with TLS. It does not have the "--docker" siwtch so you have to remove that and use the exact replacement commands that were in that github comment.
I really don’t think TLS is supported yet.
I don’t see anything from you 🤔 Nor in the service logs 🤔
We had a wonderful day yesterday :) We went on this train for a ride (30 minutes each way).
@xuu @movq@www.uninformativ.de The Mills DC here does about ~2TB of traffic per month 🤣 ~7TB locally.
1995, when people still had legs on the Metaverse
@prologic@twtxt.net laughs.. I’m in danger.
@prologic@twtxt.net laughs.. I’m in danger.
Hmm need to figure out a way to squelch the size of my pod’s data directory 🤔
test photo upload
If anyone remembers my rant, about the strange Club Penguin sequel, that requested very personal information and documents for verification - it somehow got even stranger. I got a couple more e-mails from them, trying to get me to finish my registration, before I set my spam filter, to get rid of future reminders.
For some reason completely beyond my understanding, after a few months passed, their system just automatically assumed that I went through with it and sent me the following e-mail, congratulating me for doing so:
Sure enough, this is not just a “rogue mail server” and my account just somehow works now, without any of the requested info.
I off-course did the responsible thing, clicked the big yellow button and downloaded the apk file onto my primary phone, installed it and gave it the requested permission, to install other things. It installed the promised Club Penguin sequel “Party Parrot World”, that still despite being a separate thing, could only be launched through the original app, that was called “Hideaway”.
To cut it “short”, it is a “technically functional multiplayer game”, in the loosest definition of all those words. It barely even loads and clicking almost anything breaks it. I have only seen a glimpse of one other player for a second, so I’m not even sure, it wasn’t some NPC, missplaced there by one of the many present bugs. Lastly there just wasn’t anything to do, besides walking around, going through the buggy menu, that usually broke the “game”, so much it had to be relaunched, or trying to find “minigames”, that either said coming soon, or were not playable on mobile.
I might still return to this thing down the line, out of pure curiosity, but a masterpiece it is not.
New profile picture. 🎉
My home town now has a street library! #Lamego
tandem paragliding today! was really nice!
Touching moss
Threads is following Twitter by getting rate limits and all that good stuff.. hahaha
97% 🥳 G’nigjt! 😴
96.6% 🥳
96.4% 🥳
Hey, Amazon, que anti-social!
It has been a long time coming (ten years since book 11!), but 2023 saw the release of book 12 of “Piracy Is Liberation”. With it, I also ordered CBA’s vol. 58, entitled “Modern Glossalia or The Erosion Of Meaning”, which focuses (or at lease includes) a reflection of the growth of the extreme right, and their uses of language.
my next goal is to save up to buy this one. its been my dream since we got our dog.
in case you were considering trying Meta Threads
@@rlafuente@ciberlandia.pt
Bom dia
had a nice walk today.
when the kids are outside he likes to check on them :)
🥁 The dumb shit of the day award goes to:
*yes this also breaks alternative front-end and people without an account, can’t even use the “real site”, at all.
aha, this explains the current twitter issues.
An official FBI document dated January 2021, obtained by the American association “Property of People” through the Freedom of Information Act.
This document summarizes the possibilities for legal access to data from nine instant messaging services: iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp and Wickr. For each software, different judicial methods are explored, such as subpoena, search warrant, active collection of communications metadata (“Pen Register”) or connection data retention law (“18 USC§2703”). Here, in essence, is the information the FBI says it can retrieve:
Apple iMessage: basic subscriber data; in the case of an iPhone user, investigators may be able to get their hands on message content if the user uses iCloud to synchronize iMessage messages or to back up data on their phone.
Line: account data (image, username, e-mail address, phone number, Line ID, creation date, usage data, etc.); if the user has not activated end-to-end encryption, investigators can retrieve the texts of exchanges over a seven-day period, but not other data (audio, video, images, location).
Signal: date and time of account creation and date of last connection.
Telegram: IP address and phone number for investigations into confirmed terrorists, otherwise nothing.
Threema: cryptographic fingerprint of phone number and e-mail address, push service tokens if used, public key, account creation date, last connection date.
Viber: account data and IP address used to create the account; investigators can also access message history (date, time, source, destination).
WeChat: basic data such as name, phone number, e-mail and IP address, but only for non-Chinese users.
WhatsApp: the targeted person’s basic data, address book and contacts who have the targeted person in their address book; it is possible to collect message metadata in real time (“Pen Register”); message content can be retrieved via iCloud backups.
Wickr: Date and time of account creation, types of terminal on which the application is installed, date of last connection, number of messages exchanged, external identifiers associated with the account (e-mail addresses, telephone numbers), avatar image, data linked to adding or deleting.
TL;DR Signal is the messaging system that provides the least information to investigators.
An official FBI document dated January 2021, obtained by the American association “Property of People” through the Freedom of Information Act.
This document summarizes the possibilities for legal access to data from nine instant messaging services: iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp and Wickr. For each software, different judicial methods are explored, such as subpoena, search warrant, active collection of communications metadata (“Pen Register”) or connection data retention law (“18 USC§2703”). Here, in essence, is the information the FBI says it can retrieve:
Apple iMessage: basic subscriber data; in the case of an iPhone user, investigators may be able to get their hands on message content if the user uses iCloud to synchronize iMessage messages or to back up data on their phone.
Line: account data (image, username, e-mail address, phone number, Line ID, creation date, usage data, etc.); if the user has not activated end-to-end encryption, investigators can retrieve the texts of exchanges over a seven-day period, but not other data (audio, video, images, location).
Signal: date and time of account creation and date of last connection.
Telegram: IP address and phone number for investigations into confirmed terrorists, otherwise nothing.
Threema: cryptographic fingerprint of phone number and e-mail address, push service tokens if used, public key, account creation date, last connection date.
Viber: account data and IP address used to create the account; investigators can also access message history (date, time, source, destination).
WeChat: basic data such as name, phone number, e-mail and IP address, but only for non-Chinese users.
WhatsApp: the targeted person’s basic data, address book and contacts who have the targeted person in their address book; it is possible to collect message metadata in real time (“Pen Register”); message content can be retrieved via iCloud backups.
Wickr: Date and time of account creation, types of terminal on which the application is installed, date of last connection, number of messages exchanged, external identifiers associated with the account (e-mail addresses, telephone numbers), avatar image, data linked to adding or deleting.
TL;DR Signal is the messaging system that provides the least information to investigators.